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Abstract
An arms race for an artificial general intelligence (AGI) would be detrimental for and even pose an existential threat to human-
ity if it results in an unfriendly AGI. In this paper, an all-pay contest model is developed to derive implications for public policy 
to avoid such an outcome. It is established that, in a winner-takes-all race, where players must invest in R&D, only the most 
competitive teams will participate. Thus, given the difficulty of AGI, the number of competing teams is unlikely ever to be 
very large. It is also established that the intention of teams competing in an AGI race, as well as the possibility of an interme-
diate outcome (prize), is important. The possibility of an intermediate prize will raise the probability of finding the dominant 
AGI application and, hence, will make public control more urgent. It is recommended that the danger of an unfriendly AGI 
can be reduced by taxing AI and using public procurement. This would reduce the pay-off of contestants, raise the amount 
of R&D needed to compete, and coordinate and incentivize co-operation. This will help to alleviate the control and political 
problems in AI. Future research is needed to elaborate the design of systems of public procurement of AI innovation and for 
appropriately adjusting the legal frameworks underpinning high-tech innovation, in particular dealing with patenting by AI.
Keywords Artificial intelligence · Innovation · Technology · Public policy
JEL classifications O33 · O38 · O14 · O15 · H57
1 Introduction
According to Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google1, Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) is probably the most important thing 
humanity which has ever worked on… more profound than 
electricity or fire. AI is expected to be one of the most 
disruptive new emerging technologies (Van de Gevel and 
Noussair 2013). Virtual digital assistants such as Amazon’s 
Echo and Alexa, Apple’s Siri, and Microsoft’s Cortana have 
become household names by making online shopping easier; 
automated vehicles from Tesla and Uber are excitedly antici-
pated to alleviate transport congestion and accidents; Goog-
les Google Duplex outraged commentators with its ability 
make telephone calls in a human voice. More generally, AI 
is increasingly being used to optimize energy use in fam-
ily homes, improve diagnoses of illness, help design new 
medications, and assist in surgery, amongst others (Makrida-
kis 2017). In short, AI is resulting in things getting ‘easier, 
cheaper, and abundant’ (Cukier 2018, p.  165).
AI refers to ‘machines that act intelligently … when a 
machine can make the right decision in uncertain cir-
cumstances; it can be said to be intelligent’ (New Scien-
tist 2017, p.  3). A distinction needs to be made between 
‘narrow’ (or ‘weak’) AI and Artificial General Intelligence 
(AGI) (‘strong’ AI). Narrow AI is an AI that makes use 
of algorithms to exploit large volumes of data to make 
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predictions, using ‘deep learning’2 to learn more from data 
about a specific domain (LeCun et al. 2015). Narrow AI is, 
therefore, domain-specific, excellent at specific tasks such as 
playing chess or recommending a product; its ‘intelligence’, 
however, cannot transfer to another domain. In contrast, AGI 
refers to a true intelligence that would be indistinguishable 
from human intelligence and that can be applied to all prob-
lem solving, and that would present a new general-purpose 
technology (Trajtenberg 2018).
AGI does not exist at the time of writing this paper. All 
aforementioned examples of AI are narrow AI applications. 
Whilst impressive it remains the case that these are mindless 
algorithms, with ‘the intelligence of an abacus: that is, zero’ 
(Floridi 2018, p.  157). They pose in this form no existential 
threat to humans (Bentley 2018). Although an AGI with gen-
eral capabilities that are comparable to human intelligence 
does not yet exist, it remains an enticing goal.
Many scientists have predicted that with advances in com-
puting power, data science, cognitive neuroscience, and bio-
engineering continuing at an exponential rate (often citing 
Moore’s Law) that a ‘Singularity’ point will be reached in 
the not-too-distant future, at which time AGI will exceed 
human-level intelligence (Kurzweil 2005). It may result in 
an ‘intelligence explosion’ (Chalmers 2010) heralding a 
‘human-machine civilization’ (Van de Gevel and Noussair 
2013, p.  2). At this point ‘economic growth will accelerate 
sharply as an ever-increasing pace of improvements cascade 
through the economy’ (Nordhaus 2015, p.  2). The year 2045 
has been identified as a likely date for the singularity (Kur-
zweil 2005; Brynjolfsson et al. 2017; AI Impacts 2015).
Whichever high-tech firm or government lab succeed in 
inventing the first AGI will obtain a potentially world-dom-
inating technology. The gap in welfare between countries 
where an AGI reside and where a ‘Singularity’ is achieved, 
and other, a lagging countries, could grow exponentially. 
Moreover, if the countries with the first access to an AGI 
technology progress with such leaps and bounds that their 
citizens ‘extend their lifespans tenfold‘ and even start to 
merge with robots, then one could see an entire new class 
of specially privileged humans appear (Van de Gevel and 
Noussair 2013).
This potential winner-takes-all prize that the invention 
of a true AGI raises the spectre of a competitive race for an 
AGI.3 The incentives for high-tech firms to engage in a race 
are twofold. One, as discussed above, is that the first-mover 
advantage and likely winner-takes-all effect for a firm that 
invents the first truly AGI (Armstrong et al. 2016). Second, 
given that two-thirds of GDP in advanced economies are 
paid to labor, any AI that would make labor much more 
productive would have a substantial economic return (Van de 
Gevel and Noussair 2013; PwC 2017). In addition to these 
monetary incentives, a further motivating factor to race to 
invent an AGI is due to the beliefs, often religious-like, that 
more and more people have in technology as saviour of 
humanity. See the discussion in Evans (2017) and Harari 
(2011, 2016).4
The problem with a race for an AGI is that it may result in 
a poor-quality AGI that does not take the welfare of human-
ity into consideration (Bostrom 2017). This is because the 
competing firms in the arms race may cut corners and com-
promise on the safety standards in AGI (Armstrong et al. 
2016). This could result in an ‘AI disaster’ where an AGI 
wipe out all humans, either intentionally or neglectfully, or 
may be misused by some humans against others, or benefit 
only a small subset of humanity (AI Impacts 2016). Chalm-
ers (2010) raises the spectre of a ‘Singularity bomb’ which 
would be an AI designed to destroy the planet. As Stephan 
Hawking has warned, AGI could be the ‘worst mistake in 
history’ (Ford 2016, p.  225).
To avoid the ‘worst mistake in history’, it is necessary to 
understand the nature of an AGI race, and how to avoid that 
it leads to unfriendly AGI. In this light, the present paper 
develops an all-pay contest model of an AGI race and to 
establish the following results. First, in a winner-takes-all 
race, where players must invest in R&D, only the most com-
petitive teams will participate. Thus, given the difficulty of 
AGI, the number of competing teams is unlikely ever to be 
very large. This reduces the control problem. Second, the 
intention of teams competing in an AGI race as well as the 
possibility of an intermediate outcome (prize) is important. 
The possibility of an intermediate prize will improve the 
probability that an AGI will be created and, hence, make 
public control even more urgent. The key policy recommen-
dations are to tax AI and use public procurement. These 
measures would reduce the pay-off of contestants, raise the 
3 For the sake of clarity: with the words ‘AGI race’ in this paper is 
meant a competition or contest between various teams (firms, govern-
ment labs, and inventors) to invent the first AGI. It does not refer to a 
convention ‘arms’ race where opposing forces accelerate the devel-
opment of new sophisticated weapons systems that may utilize AI, 
although there is of course concern that the AGI that may emerge 
from a race will be utilized in actual arms races to perfect what is 
known as Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAW) [see Roff (2014)].
4 As Evans (2017, p.  221) point out ‘Kurzweil’s vision for the Sin-
gularity is reminiscent of the early twenty-century Christian mys-
tic Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who imagined the material universe 
becoming progressively more animated by spiritual ecstasy’.
2 ‘Deep-learning methods are representation-learning methods with 
multiple levels of representation, obtained by composing simple but 
non-linear modules that each transform the representation at one level 
(starting with the raw input) into a representation at a higher, slightly 
more abstract level higher layers of representation amplify aspects of 
the input that are important for discrimination and suppress irrelevant 
variations’ (LeCun et al. 2015, p. 436).
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amount of R&D needed to compete, and coordinate and 
incentivize co-operation.
The novel contribution of this paper is to build on the 
pioneering paper of Armstrong et al. (2016), and provide a 
rigorous and strategic analysis, from an economics perspec-
tive, on how government policies can influence the nature 
of AI. Armstrong et al. (2016) established that the likeli-
hood of avoiding an AI disaster and getting a ‘friendlier’ 
AGI depends crucially on reducing the number of competing 
teams. They also established that, with better AI develop-
ment capabilities, research teams will be less inclined to take 
risks in compromising on safety and alignment. The unan-
swered questions in the Armstrong et al. (2016) model are, 
however, precisely how government can steer the number 
of competing teams? How can government policy reduce 
competition in the race for an AGI and raise the importance 
of capability? Should AI be taxed and/or nationalized? In 
this paper, the contribution is to answer these questions and 
show that the danger of an unfriendly AGI can indeed, in 
principle, be reduced by taxing AI and using public procure-
ment. This would reduce the pay-off of contestants, raise 
the amount of R&D needed to compete, and coordinate and 
incentivize co-operation. All of these effects will help to 
alleviate the control and political problems in AI.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
an overview of the current literature and underscores the 
importance of development of a friendly AI and the funda-
mental challenges in this respect, consisting of a control (or 
alignment) problem and a political problem. In Sect. 3 an 
all-pay contest model of an AGI race is developed wherein 
the key mechanisms and public policy instruments to reduce 
an unfavorable outcome are identified. Section 4 discusses 
various policy implications. Section 5 concludes with a sum-
mary and recommendations.
2  Related literature
An AGI does not yet exist, although it has been claimed 
that, by the year 2045, AGI will be strong enough to trig-
ger a ‘Singularity’ (Brynjolfsson et al. 2017). These claims 
are based on substantial current activity in AI, reflected 
amongst others in rising R&D expenditure and patenting 
in AI5 (Webb et al. 2018) and rising investment into new 
AI-based businesses.6 The search is on to develop the best 
AI algorithms, the fastest supercomputers, and to possess 
the largest data sets.
This has resulted in what can be described as an AI race 
between high-tech giants such as Facebook, Google, Ama-
zon, Alibaba and Tencent amongst others. Governments 
are not neutral in this: the Chinese government is provid-
ing much direct support for the development of AI,7 aiming 
explicitly to be the world’s leader in AI by 2030 (Mubayi 
et al. 2017); in 2016, the USA government8 released its 
‘National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development 
Strategic Plan’ and, in 2018, the UK’s Select Committee 
on Artificial Intelligence, appointed by the House of Lords, 
released their report on a strategic vision for AI in the UK, 
arguing that ‘the UK is in a strong position to be among the 
world leaders in the development of artificial intelligence 
during the twenty-first century‘ (House of Lords 2018, p.  5).
The races or contests in AI development are largely in 
the narrow domains of AI. These pose, at present, no exis-
tential threat to humans (Bentley 2018), although relative 
lesser threats and problems in the design and application of 
these narrow AI have, in recent times, been the subject of 
increased scrutiny.9 For instance, narrow AI and related ICT 
technologies have been misused for hacking, fake news and 
have been criticized for being biased, for invading privacy 
and even for threatening democracy [see Cockburn et al. 
(2017), Gill (2016), Helbing et al. (2017), Susaria (2018), 
Sharma (2018)]. The potential for narrow AI applications to 
automate jobs and, thus, raise unemployment and inequality 
have led to a growing debate and scholarly literature [see 
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), Bessen (2018), Brynjolfs-
son and McAfee (2015), Frey and Osborne (2017), Ford 
(2016)]. All of these issues have raised calls for more robust 
government regulation and steering or control of (narrow) 
AI (Baum 2017; Korinek and Stiglitz 2017; Kanbur 2018; 
Metzinger et al. 2018; WEF 2018).
More concern for its existential risks to humanity has 
been on races to develop an AGI. Given the huge incentives 
for inventing an AGI, it is precautionary to assume that such 
a race is part of the general AI race that was described in 
the above paragraphs. As was mentioned, whichever high-
tech firm or government lab succeed in inventing the first 
5 Webb et  al. (2018,  p.    5) document ‘dramatic growth’ in patent 
applications at the USPTO in AI fields like machine learning, neu-
ral networks, and autonomous vehicles. For instance, the number of 
annual patent applications for machine learning inventions increased 
about 18-fold between 2000 and 2015.
6 Worldwide investment into AI start-ups increased tenfold from 
USD 1.74 billion in 2013 USD 15.4 billion by 2017 (Statista 2018).
7 One of the worlds largest AI start-ups in recent years is a Chinese 
company called SenseTime, who raised more than USD 1.2 billion in 
start-up capital over the past 3 years. The company provides facial-
recognition technology that is used in camera surveillance (Bloomb-
erg 2018).
8 See the National Science and Technology Council (2016).
9 A survey on the economic impacts of AI, on, for instance, jobs, ine-
quality, and productivity, is contained in Naudé (2019).
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AGI will obtain a potentially world-dominating technology. 
Whatever AGI first emerges will have the opportunity to 
suppress any other AGI from arising (Yudkowsky 2008). 
They will enjoy winner-takes-all profits.
Whereas narrow AI may pose challenges that require more 
and better government control and regulation, it still poses no 
existential risk to humanity (Bentley 2018). With an AGI, it 
is a different matter. There are three sources of risk.
The first is that a race to be the winner in inventing an 
AGI will result in a poor-quality AGI (Bostrom 2017). This 
is because the competing firms in the arms race may cut 
corners and compromise on the safety standards in AGI 
(Armstrong et al. 2016).
A second is that the race may be won by a malevolent 
group, perhaps, a terrorist group or state who then use the 
AGI to either wipe out all humans or misused it against oth-
ers (AI Impacts 2016; Chalmers 2010). Less dramatically, 
it may be won by a self-interest group who monopolizes the 
benefits of an AGI for itself (Bostrom 2017).
A third is that even if the winner designs an AGI that 
appears to be friendly, it may still have compromised on 
ensuring that this is the case and leave it open that the AGI 
will not necessarily serve the interests of humans. In this 
latter case, the challenge has been described as the ‘Fal-
lacy of the Giant Cheesecake’. As put by Yudkowsky 
(2008, p.  314–315):
‘A superintelligence could build enormous cheesecakes 
cheesecakes the size of cities by golly, the future will be full 
of giant cheesecakes! The question is whether the superintel-
ligence wants to build giant cheesecakes. The vision leaps 
directly from capability to actuality, without considering the 
necessary intermediate of motive’.
There is no guarantee that an AGI will have the motive, or 
reason, to help humans. In fact, it may even, deliberately or 
accidently, wipe out humanity, or make it easier for humans 
to wipe itself out.10 This uncertainty is what many see as, 
perhaps, the most dangerous aspects of current investments 
into developing an AGI, because no cost–benefit analysis can 
be made, and risks cannot be quantified (Yudkowsky 2008).
Thus, it seems that there is a strong prudential case to be 
made for steering the development of all AI, but especially 
so for an AGI, where the risks are existential. In particular, 
a competitive race for an AGI seems very unhelpful, as it 
will accentuate the three sources of risk discussed above 
(Naudé 2019).
Furthermore, a competitive race for an AGI would be 
sub-optimal from the point of view of nature of an AGI as a 
public good (AI Impacts 2016). An AGI would be a ‘single-
best effort public good’ which is the kind of global public 
good that can be supplied ‘unilaterally or multilaterally’; that 
is, it requires a deliberate effort of one country or a coalition 
of countries to be generated, but will benefit all countries in 
the world once it is available (Barrett 2007, p.  3).
To steer the development of AGI, and specifically through 
ameliorating the dangers of a race for an AGI, the literature 
has identified two generic problems: the control problem 
(or alignment problem) and the political problem (Bostrom 
2014, 2017).
The control problem is defined by Bostrom (2014, p.  v) 
as ‘the problem of how to control what the superintelligence 
would do’; in other words, the challenge to ‘design AI sys-
tems, such that they do what their designers intend’ (Bos-
trom 2017, p.  5). This is also known as the ‘alignment prob-
lem’, of how to align the objectives or values of humans with 
the outcomes of what the AGI will do. Yudkowsky (2016) 
illustrates why the alignment problem is a very hard prob-
lem; for instance, if the reward function (or utility function) 
that the AGI optimizes indicates that all harm to humans 
should be prevented, an AGI may try to prevent people from 
crossing the street, given that there may be a small probabil-
ity that people may get hurt by doing so. In other words, as 
Gallagher (2018) has put it, the difficulty of aligning AI is 
that ‘a misaligned AI does not need to be malicious to do us 
harm’. See also Everitt and Hutter (2008) for a discussion of 
sources of misalignment that can arise.
The political problem in AI research refers to the chal-
lenge ‘how to achieve a situation in which individuals or 
institutions empowered by such AI use it in ways that pro-
mote the common good’ (Bostrom 2017, p.  5). For instance, 
promoting the common good would lead society to try and 
prevent that any self-interested group monopolizes the ben-
efits of an AGI for itself (Bostrom 2017).
Both the control problem and the political problem may be 
made worse if a race for an AGI starts. This is illustrated by 
(Armstrong et al. 2016) who provides one of the first models 
of an AI race. In their model, there are various competing 
teams all racing to develop the first AGI. They are spurned on 
by the incentive of reaping winner-takes-all effects and will 
do so if they can by ‘skimping’ on safety precautions (includ-
ing alignment) (Armstrong et al. 2016, p.  201). As winner, 
they can monopolize the benefits of AGI, and during the race, 
they be less concerned about alignment. The outcome could, 
therefore, be of the worse kind.
The model of Armstrong et al. (2016) shows that the like-
lihood of avoiding an AI disaster and getting a ‘friendlier’ 
AGI depends crucially on reducing the number of compet-
ing teams. They also show that, with better AI development 
capabilities, research teams will be less inclined to take 
risks in compromising on safety and alignment. As these 
are core results from which the modeling in the next section 
10 Hence ‘Moore’s Law of Mad Science: every 18 months, the min-
imum IQ necessary to destroy the world drops by one point’ (Yud-
kowsky 2008, p.  338).
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of this paper proceeds from, it is worthwhile to provide a 
short summary of the Armstrong et al. (2016) model in this 
respect.
They model n different teams, each with an ability c, 
and with choice s of ‘safety precautions’ (which can also be 
taken to stand for degree of alignment more broadly) where 
0 ≤ s ≤ 1 with s = 0 when there is no alignment and s = 1 
when there is perfect alignment. They award each team a 
score of (c − s) and the team with the highest score wins by 
creating the first AGI. Whether or not the AGI is friendly 
depends on the degree of alignment (s) of the winning team. 
They assume that teams do not have a choice of c, which is 
randomly assigned as given by the exogenous state of tech-
nology, and then show that the Nash equilibrium depends on 
the information that the teams have about their own c and the 
c of other teams. They can have either no information, only 
information about their own c, or full public information 
about every teams c.
Under each Nash equilibrium, Armstrong et al. (2016) 
then calculates the probability of an AI disaster with either 
two or five teams competing. Their results show that ‘com-
petition might spur a race to the bottom if there are too 
many teams’ (p.   205) and that ‘increasing the importance 
of capability must decrease overall risk. One is less inclined 
to skimp on safety precautions if one can only get a small 
advantage from doing so’ (p.   204).
The unanswered question in the Armstrong et al. (2016) 
model is precisely how government can steer the number 
of competing teams? How can government policy reduce 
competition in the race for an AGI and raise the importance 
of capability? Should AI be taxed and/or nationalized?
In the next section, an all-pay contest model is used to 
study the determinants of the decisions of potential AGI 
competing teams to invest in and compete an AGI race and 
to answer the above questions. All-pay contests models are 
a class of games where various participants compete for a 
prize, or more than one prize. Their distinguishing feature is 
that everyone pays for participation, and so, losers will also 
have to pay. Moreover, since Tullock (1980) contests have 
been conceived as probabilistic competitions where despite 
the effort made victory is not certain, and with the winning 
probability being positively related to ones investment and 
negative related to the opponents investment. They have 
been applied to a variety of socio-economic situations (Kon-
rad 2009; Kydd 2015; Vojnovic 2015). An important aspect 
of contests is individual asymmetries (Siegel 2009) which, 
as in the model used in the present paper, could determine if, 
and how much, effort would be exerted in the competition. 
It is appropriate to study an AGI arms race as an all-pay 
contest given that, as Armstrong et al. (2016) also stress, 
the differing ability (c in their model) of competing teams 
(and their information about this c) is a determining factor 
in the race. Indeed, all-pay contest models have been used 
in the literature to study very similar problems, such as, for 
instance, R&D competitions (Dasgupta 1986).
In the next section, the model is used to illustrate, inter 
alia, that by taxing AI and by publicly procuring an AGI, 
that the public sector could reduce the pay-off from an AGI, 
raising the amount of R&D that firms need to invest in AGI 
development, coordinate and incentivize co-operation, and, 
hence, address the control and political problems in AI. It is 
also showed that the intention (or goals) of teams competing 
in an AGI race, as well as the possibility of an intermediate 
outcome (second prize) may be important. Specifically, there 
will be more competitors in the race if the most competitive 
firm has objective probability of success, rather than profit 
maximization, and if some intermediate result (or second 
prize) is possible, rather than only one dominant AGI.
3  Theoretical model
The following simple model can provide some insights on 
various potential teams decision to enter into and behavior 
in an AGI arms race. Assuming the AGI arms race to be 
a winner-takes-all type of competition (as we discussed in 
Sect. 2), it can be modeled as an all-pay contest, where only 
the winning team gets a prize, the invention of the AGI, but 
every team has to invest resources to enter the race, and 
so everyone pays. With no major loss of generality, for an 
initial illustration of the model, consider the following static 
framework in Sect. 3.1.
3.1  Set‑up and decision to enter the race
The decision to enter an AGI race will depend on a team’s 
perceptions of the factors that will most critically affect its 
possibility to win the race: (1) its own current technology, 
the (2) effort made by competing teams; and (3) the unit cost 
of a team’s own effort.
Suppose that i = 1, 2 denotes two teams. Each team 
participates in the race for developing an AGI, which will 
dominate all previous AI applications and confer a definitive 
advantage over the other team. The final outcome of such 
investment is normalized to 1 in case the AGI race is won, 
and to 0 if the AGI race is lost. Later, this assumption of 
only one prize to the winner is relaxed, and an intermediate 
possibility, akin to a second prize, will be considered given 
that there may still be commercial value in the investments 
that the losing firm has undertaken.
If xi is the amount invested by team i in the race and 
0 ≤ ai ≤ 1 , then the probability for team i to win the AGI 
race is given by the following:
(1)pi = ai
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
,
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with i ≠ j = 1, 2.
Some comments are in order.
Expression (1) is a specification of the so-called contest 
function (Konrad 2009; Vojnovic 2015) which defines the 
winning probability in a competition.
The parameter ai is the maximum probability that team 
i will invent the dominating AGI application. In this sense, 
it can interpreted as what team i can innovate, since, based 
on the team’s technology and knowledge and innovation 
capability, it could not achieve a higher likelihood of 
success.
The number bi ≥ 0 reflects how team i can find the AGI 
dominant application. This is because even if the opponent 
does not invest, xj = 0 , team i may still fail to obtain the 
highest successful probability ai , since, for bi > 0 , it is
If bi = 0 , then team i could achieve ai with arbitrarily small 
investment xi > 0 , which means that the only obstacle pre-
venting i to obtain the highest possible success probability 
is the opposing team.
Success in the race depends on how much the opponents 
invest as well as on the technological difficulty associ-
ated to the R&D process. For this reason, it may be that 
even with very high levels of investment, success may not 
be guaranteed, since technological difficulties could be 
insurmountable given the current level of knowledge, see 
Marcus (2015).
Parameters ai and bi formalize the intrinsic difficulty 
for team i of the AI R&D activity: the higher ai the higher 
potential has i′s technology, while the higher is bi the more 
difficult is R&D. Based on (1), it follows that the total prob-
ability that one of the two teams will find the dominating 
AGI application is:
where (3) is satisfied with equality only if ai = 1 and bi = 0 
for both i = 1, 2 . When (3) is satisfied as a strict inequality, 
there is a positive probability that no team would succeed 
in winning the race, due to the difficulty of the R&D pro-
cess, given that AGI is a ‘hard’ challenge (Van de Gevel and 
Noussair 2013).
For both teams, it is assumed that the winning probability 
is the objective function and that its maximization is their 
goal, subject to the (economic) constraint that the expected 
profit should be non-negative. Moreover, if ci is the unit cost 
for team i, then the firm’s profit is a random variable defined 
as: Πi = 1 − cixi with probability ai
(
xi
bi+xi+xj
)
 and Πi = −cixi 
with probability 1 − ai
(
xi
bi+xi+xj
)
.
(2)ai
(
xi
bi + xi
)
< ai.
(3)a1
(
x1
b1 + x1 + x2
)
+ a2
(
x2
b2 + x1 + x2
)
≤ 1,
This means that the team’s expected profit is given by 
the following:
so that EΠi ≥ 0 defines self-sustainability of the R&D pro-
cess, which represents the constraint in the probability maxi-
mization problem. Hence, team i’s problem, in the AGI race, 
can be formulated as Maxxiai
(
xi
bi+xi+xj
)
 , such that 
EΠi = ai
(
xi
bi+xi+xj
)
− cixi ≥ 0 and xi ≥ 0.
Defining 휌i =
ai
ci
− bi , it is possible to find the best 
response correspondences x1 = B1(x2) and x2 = B2(x1) for 
the two teams as follows:
if 휌1 ≤ x2
or
if otherwise, and
if 휌2 ≤ x1
or
if otherwise.
The coefficient 휌i is a summary of the relevant economic 
and technological parameters playing a role in the AGI 
arms race, including as was discussed in Sect. 2, the state 
of technology, the capability of teams, the openness of 
information, and the potential size of the winner-take-all 
effects. For this reason, 휌i is the competition coefficient 
of player i.
The following first result can now be formulated as 
proposition 1:
Proposition 1 Suppose 𝜌1 > max(0, 𝜌2) : then the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the AGI race is the pair of strategies 
(x1 = 휌1;x2 = 0) , while if max(휌1, 휌2) ≤ 0 the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game is (x1 = 0;x2 = 0) . If 𝜌2 > max(0, 𝜌1) 
then the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is the pair of 
strategies (x1 = 0;x2 = 휌2) . Finally, if 휌1 = 휌 = 휌2 then any 
pair (x1 = x;x2 = 휌 − x) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 휌 is a Nash equilibrium 
of the game.
Proof see Appendix 1.   ◻
(4)EΠi = ai
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
− cixi
(5)x1 = B1(x2) = 0,
(6)x1 = B1(x2) = 휌1 − x2,
(7)x2 = B2(x1) = 0,
(8)x2 = B2(x1) = 휌2 − x1,
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The above result provides some early, interesting, 
insights. In general, in such a winner takes-all race, only 
the team with the best competition coefficient will partici-
pate in the race, while the other (s) will not enter the race. 
If teams have the same coefficient, they both participate 
(unless 휌 ≤ 0 ) in which case, there is a multiplicity of Nash 
equilibria.
When the Nash Equil ibr ium is def ined by 
(xi =
ai
ci
− bi; xj = 0) , the winning probability (1) for team i 
is as follows:
In other words, the winning probability is equal to the maxi-
mum probability of success ai minus a term which is increas-
ing in the unit cost and the technological parameter bi . The 
smaller are these last two quantities, the closer to its maxi-
mum is team i’ s winning probability.
The above result can be generalized to any number n > 1 
of teams as follows.
Corollary 1 Suppose 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = … = 𝜌k = 𝜌 > 𝜌k+1 ≥… ≥ 𝜌n , with 
1 ≤ k ≤ n the competition coefficients of the n teams. Then, 
any profile z = (x1, x2,… , xk, xk+1 = 0, xk+2 = 0,… , xn = 0) 
with xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2,… , n and Σxi = 휌 is a Nash equi-
librium, since, for each i = 1, 2,… , n the best reply cor-
respondence is defined as xi = Bi(x−i) = 0 if 휌i ≤ x−i and 
xi = Bi(x−i) = 휌i − x−i , if otherwise, with x−i = z − xj.
Proof see Appendix 2.   ◻
It is easy to see that any of the above profiles is a Nash 
equilibrium by simply checking that each component is best 
reply against the remaining ones.
To summarize, in a winner-takes-all race for developing 
an AGI, where players must invest in R&D effort to maxi-
mize success probability, only the most competitive teams 
will participate, while the others would prefer not to. This 
suggests that, given the ‘hard’ challenge that AGI poses, the 
degree of competition in the race, as reflected by the number 
of competing teams, is unlikely to be very large, thus poten-
tially signaling that the control problem is not as arduous as 
may be assumed. Armstrong et al. (2016) is, for instance, 
concerned about the number of teams competing for AI. The 
conclusion that the number of competing teams for a AGI 
will never be very large seems at least at present, to be borne 
out by the fact that most of the competitive research into 
AI, as reflected by USA patent applications in, for example, 
(9)pi = ai
⎛⎜⎜⎝
ai
ci
− bi
ai
ci
⎞⎟⎟⎠ = ai − cibi.
machine learning, is by far dominated by only three firms:11 
Amazon, IBM and Google (Webb et al. 2018).
3.2  Goals of competing teams
The pool of participating teams may change if teams would 
pursue alternative goals. To see this, consider again two 
teams, i = 1, 2 with 𝜌1 > 𝜌2 but now suppose that team 1, 
rather than maximizing success probability would pursue 
expected profit maximization. That is, it would solve the 
following problem:
From the first-order conditions for team 1, one can derive 
the following:
Because when 𝜌1 > 0 at x2 = 0 , it is 0 < B1(0) =√
a1
c1
b1 − b1 < 𝜌1 , and since (11) is concave in x2 , with 
B1(x2) = 0 at x2 = −b1 and x2 = 휌1 , the following holds:
Proposition 2 Suppose that 𝜌1 > 0 . If 
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1 ≥
Max(0, 휌2) , then the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is 
the pair of strategies (x1 =
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1;x2 = 0) . If 
0 <
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1 ≤ 𝜌2 , then (x1 = 휌2 − x2;x2 = (휌2+b1)
2
c1
a1
− b1) is 
the unique Nash equilibrium:
Proof see Appendix 3   ◻
Proposition 2 illustrates conditions for which both teams 
could participate in the AGI race, but pursue different goals. 
The intuition is the following. If the more competitive team 
maximizes profit, then, in general, it would invest less to try 
to win the race, than when aiming to maximize the prob-
ability of winning. As a result, the less competitive team 
would not be discouraged by an opponent whom invests a 
high amount, and in turn, take part in the race.
(10)
Maxx1 =Max
(
0,EΠ1 = a1
(
x1
b1 + x1 + x2
)
− c1x1
)
such, that x1 ≥ 0.
(11)x1 = B1(x2) =
√
a1
c1
(b1 + x2) − (b1 + x2).
11 This does not, however, take into account Chinese firms such as 
Tencent and Alibaba, both whom have been doing increased research 
into AI. Still, the general conclusion is that the number of serious 
contenders for the AGI prize is no more than half a dozen or so.
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4  Comparative statics and policy 
implications
In this section, it is explored how the teams’ behavior can be 
affected by changing some of the elements in the race. In the 
first Sect. 4.1, the set of possible race outcomes are enlarged.
4.1  A more general AGI race: allowing for a second 
prize
Consider again the previous two team model but suppose that 
the set of outcomes rather than being 0 or 1, that is either the 
dominant AGI application is found, or nothing is found, there 
is a possible third result 0 < 𝛼 < 1 . This is to model the idea 
that some intermediate outcome, between dominance and fail-
ure, could obtain even when the most desirable AGI applica-
tion is not achieved. This is akin to a ‘second prize’.
The interest here is in exploring how such partial success 
(failure) could impact on the investment decision of participat-
ing teams. Moreover, introducing a third outcome (or second 
prize) can provide insights on the possible role of the public 
sector in steering the AGI race.
In what follows, it is assumed that achieving the dominant 
AGI application implies also obtaining the intermediate out-
come, but that, in this case, only the dominant application will 
matter. Moreover, to keep things sufficiently simple, team i’s 
probability of obtaining only the intermediate outcome is 
given by di(
xi
bi+xi+xj
) , with 0 < 𝛼i ≤ di < 1 , modeling the idea 
that the technology for obtaining such AGI application is the 
same as for the dominant application, except for a higher upper 
bound in the success probability.
For this reason, assuming that 0 ≤ (훼i + di) ≤ 1 team i’s 
profit function can take on three possibilities:
and its expected profit is given by the following:
(12)Πi =1 − cixi with probability ai
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
,
(13)Πi =훼 − cixi with probability di
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
,
(14)
Πi = − cixi with probability 1 − (ai + di)
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
,
(15)EΠi = (ai + 훼di)
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
− cixi,
that is as if the race was still with two outcomes, 0 and 1, but 
with success probability now given by (ai + 훼di)(
xi
bi+xi+xj
) 
rather than only by ai(
xi
bi+xi+xj
).
Notice that (12)–(14) implies that, unlike the dominant 
winner-takes-all AGI application, 훼 could also be obtained 
by both teams and not by one of them only.
Therefore, posing ái = (ai + 𝛼di) and defining the modi-
fied competition coefficient as ?́?i =
?́?i
ci
− bi , the following 
is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1:
Corollary 2 Suppose ?́?1 > max(0, ?́?2) : then the unique 
Nash equilibrium of the AGI race is the pair of strategies 
(x1 = ?́?1;x2 = 0) , while if max(?́?1, ?́?2) ≤ 0 the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the game is (x1 = 0;x2 = 0) . If ?́?2 > max(0, ?́?1) , 
then the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is the pair of 
strategies (x1 = 0;x2 = ?́?2 . Finally, if ?́?1 = 𝜌 = ?́?2 , then any 
pair (x1 = x;x2 = ?́? − x) with 0 ≤ x ≤ ?́? is a Nash equilibrium 
of the game.
The implication from this extension is as follows. Since 
ái > a , then ?́?i > 𝜌i : therefore, when a second prize is pos-
sible, teams in the race will tend to invest more than without 
such a possibility. Therefore, the presence of such intermedi-
ate result or second prize serve as an incentive to strengthen 
team efforts, increasing both the probability of finding the 
dominant AGI application as well as the non-dominant one. 
The outcome reduces the risk of complete failure and in so 
doing induces higher investments than in a pure winner-takes-
all race.
In this case, it is easy to see that outcome 1 would be 
obtained with probability:
and outcome 훼 with probability:
with qi < ṕi if ai < di <
ai
(1−𝛼)
 , that is if di is small enough.
4.2  Policy implications
One of the main conclusions from the literature surveyed 
in Sect. 2 is that the avoidance of an AGI race would 
require government to influence AGI research in a man-
ner that will reduce the returns to teams from taking risks 
in AI development.
(16)ṕi =
(ái − cibi)ái
ái
(17)qi = di
⎛⎜⎜⎝
ái
ci
− bi
ái
ci
⎞⎟⎟⎠ =
di(ái − cibi)
ái
=
diṕi
ái
.
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In this regard, the model results set out in the preceding 
sections suggest a number of policy implications to steer the 
race for an AGI.
To see this, first, consider the above winner-takes-all race 
with no intermediate outcome (no second prize) (Sect. 3.1) 
and assume that the dominant AGI application, if found, 
would be considered by a public authority undesirable 
(unfriendly) perhaps due to the fact that the winning team 
took too many risks and ‘skimped’ on safety regulations.
What could the public sector do to decrease the likelihood 
of such an unfriendly discovery?
In the following sub-sections, four public policy initia-
tives that emanates from the model are discussed: (1) intro-
ducing an intermediate prize, (2) using public procurement 
of innovation, (3) taxing an AGI, and (4) addressing patent-
ing by AI.
4.2.1  Introducing an intermediate prize
One drastic measure would be to prohibit altogether teams 
(firms) to work towards an AGI, declaring the existential 
risk to humanity (as was discussed in Sect. 2) to be the over-
riding constraint. This seems, however, not to be feasible.
The alternative is then not to prohibit the race, but to 
restrict the number of teams that compete in the race and to 
incentivize these teams to invest more in pursuing a quality, 
friendly, AGI. Given the difficult challenge that AGI poses, 
Sect. 3.1 has shown that, in any case, only the most com-
petitive teams will compete: at present, in the world, there 
may, perhaps, be only half a dozen or so teams that could 
seriously compete for an AGI.
Keeping this competitive, and even raising the bar and 
incentivizing such teams to invest more in finding a domi-
nant AGI, the public sector could introduce second prizes, 
that is prizes for intermediate results (i.e., advanced, but not 
dominating AIs). According to the model presented in this 
paper, this will increase the amount of resources invested to 
maximize success probability p. In doing so, it will either 
reduce the number of teams who could afford to participate 
and/or increase the amount of investment. This will help to 
reduce the control and political problems characterizing AI.
4.2.2  Public procurement of innovation
How could the public sector in practice introduce an inter-
mediate prize? It is proposed here that the public procure-
ment of innovation can be a useful instrument in this regard, 
and moreover one that has so far been neglected in the con-
trol or alignment of AI. Public procurement of innovation 
could attempt to steer AGI in a friendly direction by requir-
ing that certain constraints be engineered into the AI, and by 
assisting the development of complementary technologies.
As far as the engineering of constraints into AI is con-
cerned, the two key questions are: what constraints? and how 
to engineer these into AI?
Regarding the first question, Chalmers (2010, p.  31) dis-
cusses two types of constraints that will be important: inter-
nal constraints, which refers to the internal program of the 
AGI, wherein its ethical values can be encoded, for instance, 
in giving it reduced autonomy or prohibiting it from hav-
ing its own goals; and external constraints, which refers to 
limitations on the relationship between humans and AGI for 
instance in dis-incentivizing the development of AGI that 
replaces human labor and incentivizing the development of 
AGI that enhances human labor, and in trying to first create 
a AGI in a virtual world without direct contact with the real 
world (although Chalmers (2010) concludes that this may 
be very difficult and, perhaps, even impossible to ensure).
Chalmers (2010) suggests that the internal constraints 
on an AGI could be fashioned through amongst others the 
method by which humans build an AGI. If an AGI is based 
on brain emulation rather than non-human data learning sys-
tems as is primary the current case, it may end up with dif-
ferent values, perhaps more akin to human values. In addi-
tion, if values are established through allow the AGI to learn 
and evolve, then initial conditions as well as the punishment/
reward system for learning would be important to get right at 
the start. Care should be taken, however, to remove human 
biases from AGI, especially when they learn from data cre-
ated by biased humans. Concerns have already been raised 
about AI reinforcing stereotypes (Cockburn et al. 2017).
Regarding the second question, it can be proposed that 
public procurement of innovation considers learning from 
the previous examples where the public sector attempted to 
steer technology, in particular where coordination and trans-
parency are important outcomes. Two related approaches 
spring here to mind, namely the concept of Responsible 
Innovation (RI) [see, for instance, Foley et  al. (2016)] 
and the value sensitive design (VSD) framework [see, for 
instance, Johri and Nair (2011) and Umbrello (2019)]. 
Regarding the latter, Umbrello (2019, p.   1) argues that 
VSD is a ‘potentially suitable methodology for artificial 
intelligence coordination between the often-disparate pub-
lic, government bodies, and industry’. Thus, the constraints 
that were mentioned may be best built into AI applications 
if public procurement takes into consideration that the role 
of engineers and programmers are critical ‘both during and 
after the design of a technology’ (Umbrello 2019, p.  1). See 
also Umbrello and De Bellis (2018) for a theoretical case 
and Johri and Nair (2011) for an application to the case of 
the development of an ICT system in India.
In this regard, a further policy implication that emanates from 
the model in this paper is that it may be important to promote 
complementary inventions in AI. This could also be done through 
public procurement of innovation, where the needed coordination 
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could be better fostered. For instance, other complementary inno-
vations to stimulate may be in technologies that enhance human 
intelligence and integrate human and artificial intelligence over 
the longer term. Chalmers (2010) speculates that, once humans 
live in an AGI world, the options will be either extinction, isola-
tion, inferiority, or integration of humans and AGIs.
A second role for public procurement of innovation, in 
addition to helping with the engineering of constraints into 
AI, is to help generate complementary innovations. This can 
be done, for instance, by stimulating research into how ICT 
can enhance human biology, and, perhaps, even dispense with 
it completely, may be needed, for instance in genetic engi-
neering and nanotechnology. In particular, projects that study 
the challenges in and consequences of uploading brains and/
or consciousness onto computers, or implant computer chips 
and neural pathways into brains, have been gaining traction in 
the literature and popular media, and form the core agenda of 
transhumanism (O’Connell 2017).
A strong argument for public procurement rests on its abil-
ity to coordinate the search for an AGI, and thus avoid excess 
competition, as suggested for example by the EU legal provi-
sions on ‘pre-commercial procurement of innovation’ (Euro-
pean Commission 2007), as well as on the EU ‘innovation 
partnership’ (European Commission 2014). In particular, the 
‘innovation partnership’ explicitly encourages a collabora-
tive agreement between contracting authorities and the firms 
selected to develop an innovative solution.
The case for public procurement of AGI innovation is made 
stronger by the fact that because an AGI is a public good of 
the single-best effort type, a government coalition, such as the 
EU should drive the development, rather than risk, it being 
developed by the private tech-industry. In essence, this would 
boil down to the nationalization of AGI with the added advan-
tage that the danger of the misuse of AGI technology may be 
reduced, see Floridi (2018) and Nordhaus (2015). It may also 
prevent private monopolies to capture all the rents from AGI 
innovations (Korinek and Stiglitz 2017).
4.2.3  Taxation
A third policy proposal from the model presented in this sec-
tion is that the government announce the introduction of a tax 
rate 0 < t < 1 , on the team that would find the dominant AGI, 
with t depending on the extent to which the AGI is unfriendly. 
The taxation policy would, thus, be calibrated by the govern-
ment in such a way that for a friendly AGI the tax rate t is low 
and higher for unfriendly AGI. For example, if t = 1 for the 
most unfriendly solution, then, in general, the tax rate could 
be defined as follows:
where 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 is a numerical indicator set by the govern-
ment to measure the friendliness of the AGI solution, with 
t(f ) = 1 − f ,
f = 0 indicating the most undesirable solution and f = 1 
the most desirable one. In this case, for team i the expected 
profit is as follows:
wi th  t he  compet i t ion  coef f i c ien t  becoming 
𝛿i =
(1−t)ai
ci
− bi < 𝜌i , so that the amount of resources invested 
and, accordingly, the success probability of the AGI domi-
nant application would decrease. Notice that 𝛿i > 0 if:
This implies that, for a large enough tax rate, teams could be 
completely discouraged to pursue investing in finding such 
AGI dominant application. The introduction of a tax rate is 
equivalent to an intermediate outcome defined now as 
t = −
훼di
ai
 . In this case, 훼 can be interpreted as an additional 
(random) component of the cost, which can only take place 
probabilistically.
With a high enough tax rate, the effect could be seen 
as equivalent of nationalizing the AGI. A combination of 
a high tax rate on an unfriendly AGI together with the 
public procurement of a friendly AGI that aim to establish 
a (government-lead) coalition to drive the development 
of AGI may be the more pertinent policy recommenda-
tion to emerge from our analysis, given that much R&D 
in AI currently tends to be open (and may be given further 
impetus through the public procurement process) (Bostrom 
2017). With more information about the capabilities of 
teams, including their source codes, data and organiza-
tional intent known, the ‘more the danger [of an unfriendly 
AGI] increases’ (Armstrong et al. 2016, p.  201).
One final but important remark to make with respect 
to the taxation of AI is that, in the afore-going, the treat-
ment of taxation has been as if there is only a single gov-
ernment and that the AI arms race occur in one country. 
In a globalized economy where there are tax havens, tax 
competition, and loopholes, it is even proving difficult for 
governments to tax ‘old-economy’ firms. What would ulti-
mately be needed would be global coordination of taxation 
and regulation of AI. This is recognized, for instance, in 
the ‘Strategy of New Technologies’ adopted by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, who in reference to technolo-
gies such as AI states that ‘collective global responses 
are necessary’ (United Nations 2018, p.  10). While the 
principle of global coordination of AI regulation and taxa-
tion is clear, practically over the short-term at least, as the 
vast bulk of advanced research on AI is conducted in only 
a handful of countries [see WIPO (2019)], the need for 
global coordination is perhaps not acute.
(18)EΠi = (1 − t)ai
(
xi
bi + xi + xj
)
− cixi,
(19)t < 1 −
bici
ai
.
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4.2.4  Addressing patenting by AI
A finally policy recommendation that can be derived from 
the model presented in Sects. 3 and 4.1 is that patent law and 
the legal status of AGI inventions will need to be amended to 
reduce the riskiness of AGI races. In this respect, the World 
Economic Forum (WEF 2018) has warned that because an 
AGI will be able to innovate, the firm that invents the first 
AGI will enjoy a huge first-mover advantage if the innova-
tions made by the AGI will enjoy patent protection. Others, 
such as Jankel (2015), have been more dismissive of the 
potential of AI generating truly original and disruptive inno-
vations. The debate is, however, far from settled.
In terms of the model presented, patent protection may 
raise the returns from investing in a dramatic fashion and 
will raise the number of teams competing. This is a topic 
that, however, needs more research and more careful mod-
eling and is left for future research.
5  Concluding remarks
Steering the development of an artificial general (or super) 
intelligence (AGI) may be enormously important for future 
economic development, in particular, since there may only 
be one chance to get it right (Bostrom 2014). Even though 
current AI is nowhere close to being an AGI and does not 
pose any existential risks, it may be prudent to assume that 
an arms race for such a technology may be underway or 
imminent. This is because the economic gains to whichever 
firm or government lab invents the worlds first AGI) will 
be immense. Such AGI races could, however, be very detri-
mental and even pose an existential threat to humanity if it 
results in an unfriendly AI.
In this paper, it was argued that any race for an AGI will 
exacerbate the dangers of an unfriendly AI. An all-pay con-
test model was presented to derive implications for pub-
lic policy in steering the development of an AGI towards 
a friendly AI, in other words address what is known in the 
AI research literature as the control and political problems 
of AI.
It was established that in a winner-takes-all race for devel-
oping an AGI, where players must invest in R&D, only the 
most competitive teams will participate. This suggests that, 
given the difficulties of creating an AGI, the degree of com-
petition in the race, as reflected by the number of competing 
teams, is unlikely ever to be very large. This seems to be 
reflected in current reality, as the current number of feasible 
teams able to compete in an AGI race is quite low at around 
half a dozen or so.
It was also established that the intention (or goals) of 
teams competing in an AGI race as well as the possibil-
ity of an intermediate outcome (‘second prize’) may be 
important. Crucially, there will be more competitors in 
the race if the most competitive firm has objective and the 
probability of profit maximization rather than success, and 
if some intermediate result (or second prize) is possible, 
rather than only one dominant prize. Moreover, the pos-
sibility of a second prize is showed to raise the probability 
of finding the dominant AGI application, and, hence, will 
give more urgency to public policy addressing the control 
and political problems of AI.
Given that it is infeasible to ban an AGI race, it was 
shown in this paper that the danger of an unfriendly AGI 
can be reduced through a number of public policies. Spe-
cifically, four public policy initiatives were discussed: (1) 
introducing an intermediate prize (2) using public procure-
ment of innovation, (3) taxing an AGI, and (4) addressing 
patenting by AI.
These public policy recommendations can be summa-
rized by stating that, by taxing AI and by publicly procur-
ing an AGI, the public sector could reduce the pay-off 
from an AGI, raise the amount of R&D that firms need 
to invest in AGI development, and coordinate and incen-
tivize co-operation. This will help to address the control 
and political problems in AI. Future research is needed 
to elaborate the design of systems of public procurement 
of AI innovation and for appropriately adjusting the legal 
frameworks underpinning high-tech innovation, in particu-
lar dealing with patenting by AI.
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Appendix 1
With two teams, it is possible to suggest a proof which could 
be graphically visualized. Suppose that 𝜌1 < max(0, 𝜌2) . It 
follows that team 1’s best response is x1 = B1(x2) = 0 if 
휌1 ≤ x2 and x1 = B1(x2) = 휌1 − x2 , if otherwise.
when 𝜌1 > x2 can be written as x2 = 휌1 − x1 . Then, 
it follows immediately that team 2’s best response is 
x2 = B2(x1) = 0 if 휌2 ≤ x1휌2 − x1 and x2 = B2(x1) = 휌2 − x1 , 
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if otherwise. This response can meet team 1’s best 
response only at x1 = 휌1 and x2 = 0.
Analogously, if 𝜌2 > max(0, 𝜌1) , then the two best replies 
meet only at x1 = 0 and x2 = 휌2 . Finally, if 휌1 = 휌 = 휌2 the 
two best replies overlap along the segment x2 = 휌 − x1 and 
so any pair (x1 = x;x2 = 휌 − x) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 휌 is a Nash equi-
librium of the game.
Appendix 2
Suppose that 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = … = 𝜌k = 𝜌 > 𝜌k+1 ≥… ≥ 𝜌n , with 
1 ≤ k ≤ n are the competition coefficients of the n teams, and 
consider profile
with xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2,… , n and Σixi = 휌.
It is easy to see that the profile is a Nash equilibrium by 
simply checking that each component is best reply against 
the others. Indeed, consider team 1, and notice that the 
argument will be identical for any team i with 1 < i < k + 1 . 
If Σi=2xi < 𝜌 and xk+1 = 0, xk+2 = 0,… , xn = 0 ,  then 
x−1 = Σi=2xi < 𝜌 and its best reply would be x1 = 휌 − x−1 , 
so that Σixi = 휌 = Σixi .
Consider now any team i = k + 1 ; the same argument 
will hold for all i > k + 1 . In this case, x−(k+1) = Σi≠(k+1) , and 
so, team (k + 1) ’s best response would be xk+1 = 0 , which 
proves the result.
Appendix 3
Suppose team 1’s best response is as follows:
Because when 𝜌1 > 0 at x2 = 0 , it is 0 < B1(0) =
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1 , 
and since
then B1(x2) is concave in x2 with B1(x2) = 0 at x2 = −b1 and 
x2 = 휌1 . Therefore, if 
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1 ≥ max(0, 휌2) it follows 
immediately that team 2’s best response is
x2 = B2(x1) = 0 if 휌2 ≤ x1 , and x2 = B2(x1) = 휌2 − x1 , if 
otherwise.
This will match B1(x2) only at (x1 =
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1; x2 = 0 , 
which is the unique Nash equilibrium pair of investments. 
However, if 0 <
√
a1
c1
b1 − b1 < 𝜌2 , then the two best 
z = (x1, x2,… , xk, xk+1 = 0, xk+2 = 0,… , xn = 0)
x1 = B1(x2) =
√
a1
c1
(b1 + x2) − (b1 + x2).
d2B1(x2)
dx2
2
= −
1
4
(
a1
b1
)2(
a1
b1
)
(b1 + x2)
−3
2 < 0,
response match at the unique point (x1 = 휌2 − x2;
x2 = (
휌2+b1)
2
c1
a1
) − b1) , which is the only Nash equilibrium.
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